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Corporate governance and shariah noncompliant risk in Islamic banks:  
Evidence from Southeast Asia 
 
ABSTRACT 
Purpose: This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance and shariah 
noncompliant risk (SNCR) that is unique for Islamic banks. The study examines the roles of 
shariah committee along with the board of directors in mitigating SNCR.   
Methodology:  
The paper empirically investigates the implications of characteristics of board of directors and 
shariah committee on the SNCR by using a sample of 29 full-fledge Islamic banks from 
Malaysia and Indonesia over the period 2007 to 2017.  All data is hand collected from the 
Islamic banks' annual reports with the exception of country-level data collected from the World 
Bank database. 
Findings:  The results show that banks with a smaller board size and higher proportion of 
independent board members are likely to have lower SNCR. The findings also indicate that the 
financial expertise and higher frequency of shariah committee meetings reduces the SNCR. 
Collectively, our analysis shows that banks with strong corporate governance environments 
reduce SNCR.  
Practical Implications: The findings of the study sheds light on the relationship between 
corporate go 
vernance practice, shariah committee characteristics and SNCR. The results can be used by 
different stakeholders such as policy makers, boards of directors and senior management of 
Islamic banks to mitigate SNCR. 
Originality/value:  This study extends the literature on corporate governance and risk-taking 
by including additional dimensions of governance and risk type. The corporate governance 
mechanism at the board level is complemented by including the shariah committee 
characteristics and SNCR which is relevant to Islamic financial institutions is examined.   
 
Keywords: corporate governance, Indonesia, Islamic bank, Malaysia, shariah committee, 
shariah governance, shariah noncompliant risk.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The topic of risk and corporate governance in banks has received significant attention from 
regulators, bank managers, customers and academics due to the nature of high leverage, great 
opacity and the complexity of banking assets and activities, especially following the recent 
financial crisis. Evidence suggests that banks with poor governance engage in excessive risk-
taking and do so even more during a crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009; Chen and Lin, 2016; Díaz and 
Huang, 2017). Potentially, the risk exposure may be different and more complex when the 
agency relationship and governance setting deviate from their conventional form. 
There are significant differences between conventional and Islamic banks. Firstly, the aim 
of the Islamic bank is to maximise shareholder value by adhering to the shariah law (Islamic 
law) (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006, Safieddine, 2009). In particular, Islamic banks are prohibited 
from taking and charging interest (riba), getting involved in excessive risk (gharar), and using 
different instruments such as derivatives. Secondly, the governance setting includes an 
additional element of shariah governance with the shariah committee playing a key role in 
assisting the board of directors and management to ensure that shariah law is adhered to 
throughout the business operations (Ahmed, 2011a, Choudhury and Haque, 2006). Lastly, 
Islamic banks are exposed to a new type of risk known as shariah non-compliance risk in 
addition to the traditional credit, market, operational and liquidity risks. 
This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance and shariah non-
compliance risk in Malaysian and Indonesian Islamic banks in Southeast Asia. These two 
countries are among the most progressive in the development of the Islamic financial services 
industry (IFSB, 2016). Moreover, they represent the majority of Islamic banks in the Southeast 
Asian region that includes Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand and Brunei. 
This study contributes to the growing literature on the study of corporate governance and 
bank risk exposure. To our knowledge, this paper is among the first to examine shariah non-
compliance risk and corporate governance that includes features of the shariah committee. 
Though the concept of shariah non-compliant risk has been recognized, we are aware of only 
one empirical paper that examines the impact of shariah non-compliant income assets, equity 
and income of Islamic banks. Our study is closely related to that of Mollah and Zaman (2015) 
who examine the relationship between the shariah committee and performance. We expand the 
governance structure of the shariah committee used in the literature by including additional 
variables such as financial expertise, meeting frequency and shariah committee compensation. 
Furthermore, previous studies on corporate governance and bank risk-taking have mostly 
focused on traditional risks such as credit risk, market risk, interest rate risk and insolvency 
risk or the interaction among the risk categories. However, no existing studies have examined 
shariah non-compliance risk which is only relevant to Islamic financial institutions. Thus, we 
complement the work of D’Amato and Gallo (2019), Yeh (2017), Vallascas et al. (2017), Chen 
and Lin (2016), Aebi et al. (2012) and Laeven and Levine (2009) by adding another dimension 
to the governance and risk literature. 
To fill these gaps, we provide empirical evidence on the board of directors, shariah 
committee and shariah non-compliance risk. In this study, we examine the impact of individual 
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characteristics of the board (related to board size, independence directors, meeting frequency 
and compensation) and shariah committee (size, financial expertise, meeting frequency and 
compensation) on the shariah non-compliance risk. We performed our investigation using data 
on Islamic banks from Malaysia and Indonesia over the period 2007 to 2017. Based on 183 
bank-year observations, we find that the smaller board and a higher proportion of independent 
non-executive directors are associated with lower shariah non-compliant risk. There is a 
possibility that the smaller board and independent board utilizing their oversight function 
demands additional and extensive shariah audit in order to certify their monitoring role and 
mitigate the reputational losses. In addition to these findings, we also report several new results. 
We find that the level of shariah committee monitoring on shariah non-compliant risk is driven 
by the members that equipped with financial expertise and higher frequency of meetings. 
Overall, our analysis suggests that the banks with effective board and shariah committee reduce 
shariah non-compliant risk. These results are robust to various model specifications and tests.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two provides an overview of 
the shariah principles and risks and section three describes the background literature and 
hypotheses development. Section four presents the data and models specification. Section five 
reports the empirical findings and section six concludes.  
 
2. Shariah principles, Islamic Banking and Risks 
 
Starting in the 1970s from an urge to provide financial services to Muslims who would not 
deal with interest due to religious beliefs, Islamic banking has become a significant sector in 
many jurisdictions. The key distinguishing feature of Islamic banks is the adherence to shariah 
rules and principles. The Islamic guidelines prohibit engaging in sinful activities such as 
alcohol, pornography, casinos, pork-related products, etc., (El Hawary et. al 2004, Ullah et. al 
2018, Usmani 1999). At the contract level, Islamic commercial law forbids riba (literally 
meaning ‘excess’), gharar (legal ambiguity or excessive risk) and maysir (gambling) in 
transactions. While riba is usually translated as interest, it has wider connotations such as 
prohibition of sale of debt. Similarly, contemporary derivatives (forwards, futures, swaps, etc) 
are not permissible as they have elements of both riba and gharar (Ayub 2011, Usmani 1999).  
A firm is considered shariah compliant if it satisfies two criteria. First, qualitative business 
activity screening eliminates companies that are involved in products and services that are 
considered prohibited such as alcohol, pornography, casinos, pork-related products, 
conventional financial institutions, etc. Companies that pass the qualitative screening are 
further evaluated using the second quantitative financial screening criteria which identify the 
permissible benchmarks and excludes companies with unacceptable levels of conventional debt, 
liquidity and impermissible income (BinMahfouz and Ahmed 2014, Derigs and Marzban 2008, 
Khatkhatay and Nisar 2006, Obaidullah 2005.1 Any impermissible income such as interest 
earnings is ‘cleansed’ by deducting it from the income of the firm and donating the proceeds 
to charity.  
                                                          
1 For example, the Dow Jones Islamic Index uses the following criteria to identify Shariah compliant stocks: total 
debt/market cap (moving average 24 month) less than 33%; cash and interest bearing securities/ market cap 
(moving average 24 month) less than 33%; account receivables/market cap (moving average 24 month) less than 
33%; and impermissible income should not exceed 5% of total revenue (BinMahfouz and Ahmed 2014).  
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Since interest-bearing transactions are proscribed by Islamic law, Islamic banks use 
alternative permissible contracts. The key contracts used by Islamic banks can be broadly 
classified as sale, leasing, and partnerships. The sale based contracts create debt and include 
murabahah (cost-plus or mark-up sale), bai-muajjal (price-deferred or credit sale), salaam 
(object-deferred or pre-paid sale), istisna (construction/manufacturing contract). Although 
these contracts create debt, their underlying risk features are different than interest based loans 
since the former also entails market risks and are illiquid as they cannot be sold (Abedifar et 
al. 2013; Aggarwal and Yousef 2000). While leasing contracts (ijarah) are structured as 
operating leases or hire-purchase schemes, partnerships contracts of mudarabah and 
musharakah are profit-loss sharing (PLS) whereby the returns on investments are contingent 
on the performance of underlying assets or projects (Ayub 2007; Usmani 1999). 
The dominant Islamic banking model uses PLS (mudarabah) based savings/investment 
accounts on the liability side and multiple financing tools on the assets side (Ahmed 2011b; 
Ali 2012). Using shariah principles in banking operations changes the nature of risks of 
financial products and introduces some new unique risks. For example, although in principle 
the depositors using PLS based accounts are expected to share the risks of performance of the 
underlying assets, paying negative or lower returns compared to the market rates could lead to 
withdrawal risks. The overall risk profile of the assets portfolio depends on its composition and 
type of contracts used for financing. Since the financial products are based on sale, leasing or 
partnership contracts, risk-return features of these instruments change as market risks become 
an integral part of the banking book along with credit risks. While Islamic banks can use 
different modes of financing, fixed-income contracts (murabahah and ijarah) form the bulk of 
financing (Ali 2012, Chong and Liu 2009, Khan 2010).  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) defines operational risks as risks 
that are associated with failures of internal processes, people, and/or systems or the impact 
from external events (BCBS, 2009). In Islamic banks, the definition of operational risk also 
includes any risks arising from applying shariah and the failure to perform their fiduciary 
responsibilities (IFSB, 2005). A unique operational risk in Islamic banks is the shariah 
noncompliant risk (SNCR) which is defined as ‘the risk arising from Islamic banks’ failure to 
comply with the Shariah rules and principles determined by the Shariah board or the relevant 
body in the jurisdiction in which the Islamic bank operates’ (IFSB 2005). Shariah non-
compliant income is used as a proxy for shariah non-compliance risk (SNCR) (Oz et. al., 2016). 
Shariah non-compliance can result from different sources such as selling unapproved products 
or violations of terms approved by shariah committee in products and processes (Ginena 2014; 
Oz et. al. 2006). The failure to comply with shariah law in Islamic bank’s operation and 
management results in the transaction being declared as void and, thus, income from such 
activities/products are not recognised in the bank’s books and is given to charity. Since the 
revenue from these activities is excluded from the bank’s income but the costs are incurred, 
this results in net-losses on these transactions for the bank.  
Although the direct impact of SNCR is loss of income, there can also be other implications. 
Given the fiduciary role that an Islamic bank plays in managing the funds of depositors, shariah 
non-compliance can be construed as a breach of contractual obligations of adhering to shariah 
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principles (Ginena 2014).  Furthermore, shariah non-compliance risk can also result in 
reputational risk. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2009: 19) defines 
reputational risk as ‘the risk arising from negative perception on the part of customers, 
counterparties, shareholders, investors, debt-holders, market analysts, other relevant parties or 
regulators that can adversely affect a bank’s ability to maintain existing, or establish new, 
business relationships and continued access to sources of funding.’ In the case of Islamic banks, 
a unique reputational risk arises due to shariah non-compliance (Abdullah et. al., 2011; Archer 
and Abdullah, 2017). Not only can the depositors and investors lose confidence in banks due 
to losses arising from shariah non-compliance, but there is a possibility that a segment of them 
who use Islamic banks for religious convictions would withdraw their funds or close their 
accounts due to reputational reasons. In a survey carried out in three countries, Chapra and 
Ahmed (2002) find that large percentage depositors and investors of Islamic financial 
institutions’ would move their accounts to other banks if there are consistent violations of 
shariah over a period of time. 
3. Related literature and hypotheses development 
3.1. Agency theory, governance and shariah non-compliant risk in Islamic banks 
The dominant theory of corporate governance focuses on reducing the agency costs 
(monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual loss) arising from asymmetric information and 
conflicting interests between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 
and Jensen 1983, Hart 1995; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Since managers working on the basis 
of self-interest can produce results that are detrimental to the interests of shareholders, agency 
theory suggests instituting governance mechanisms to create incentive structures that reduce 
agency costs and align managers’ actions with the interests of the shareholders.   
 The implications of agency theory for governance hold for Islamic banks also since 
shareholders and managers have asymmetric information and divergent interests. However, the 
goal of maximizing profits by applying shariah principles to create additional agency issues 
and challenges that raise distinctive governance concerns.2  PLS based contracts on the liability 
side of Islamic banks change the agency relationships between the bank and depositors 
whereby the bank acts as an agent for depositors to provide shariah compliant services (Archer 
and Karim 2009; 2012, Mansour and Bhatti 2018). Neither do depositors have any information 
on how managers use their funds nor do they have any control which the shareholders have 
through the board of directors (BOD). Since most of the depositors expect the business and 
transactions to conform to their religious beliefs, shariah governance becomes an integral part 
of the governance architecture of Islamic banks (Malkawi, 2013; Grais and Pelligrini 2006a; 
Grais and Pelligrini 2006b).  
                                                          
2 Other theories also may be relevant for shariah compliance in Islamic finance. Given the nature of Islamic 
banking model and products, the stakeholders’ theory also becomes relevant to explain governance issues in these 
institutions (Hasan 2009; Iqbal and Mirakhor 2004, Grais and Pelligrini 2006a). The stakeholders’ theory 
considers the interests of other stakeholders in the objectives of firms along with the shareholders’ perspectives 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995, Freeman and Evan 1990 and Freeman et. al. 2004). Furthermore, legitimacy theory 
which explains the relationship between the organization and society at large in terms of a “social contract” may 
also be relevant for governance issues in Islamic banks (Suchman 1995, Chen and Roberts 2010, Kelton and Yang 
2008). 
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To create confidence among the stakeholders and maintain the integrity of Islamic financial 
institutions, international standard setting bodies such as IFSB (2009) have issued shariah 
governance standards. IFSB’s (2009) Guiding principles on shariah governance systems for 
institutions offering Islamic financial services identify four key elements of a robust shariah 
governance framework: issuance of shariah pronouncements by a shariah committee; ensuring 
compliance with shariah pronouncements by an in-house shariah compliance unit; internal 
shariah compliance review and audit carried out by an internal shariah review/audit unit; and 
the conducting of an annual shariah compliance audit to ensure the internal shariah audit is 
carried out properly. A vital component of the governance framework is an independent shariah 
committee (SC) consisting of Shariah scholars who are well versed in Islamic commercial law. 
One of the key functions of the SC is to issue shariah pronouncements that are implemented 
throughout the institution and their violation leads to Shariah noncompliance risk. 
 Agency problems arise in Islamic banks due to divergent goals of the BOD, managers and 
SC. The aim of shareholders is to maximize the net-present value by increasing returns and 
expanding business by attracting more customers in the longer term. Since most of the 
customers deal with Islamic banks due to religious reasons, this can be done by ensuring that 
banking operations adhere to shariah principles.  As indicated, shariah non-compliance can 
lead to loss of income in the short-run and affect reputation adversely on the longer term. The 
BCBS asserts that the governance framework in banks should have oversight on reputational 
risk and should incorporate it in the bank’s risk management processes (BCBS 2009, BCBS 
2015). As indicated above, reputational risk related to shariah noncompliance can potentially 
lead to loss of clients who engage with Islamic banks due to religious reasons. To mitigate loss 
of income in the short term and loss of business in the long term the BOD of Islamic banks 
would need to institute a credible shariah governance framework for the growth and stability 
of the bank.  
 Compensations packages and private information held by managers can create incentives 
for focussing on a short-term performance that may not be in the long-term interests of the 
shareholders (Narayanan 1985, Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011). One way in which short-term 
returns can be increased by managers is to take risks that are not recognised by the system 
(Diamond and Rajan, 2009), which in case of Islamic banks would include shariah non-
compliant risk. Remuneration and bonuses paid to managers in Islamic banks based on annual 
performances create incentives for increasing the short-term profitability. Applying shariah 
pronouncements of SC, however, can hinder the goals of profitability as the rules limit the 
markets and products that Islamic banks can serve. Ullah et. al. (2018) reports that tension can 
exist between Islamic bank’s managers who have incentives to increase profitability and 
Shariah rulings of SC that restrict profitable activities. The dominance of the managers in 
operational decision making and their drive to profitability can result in dilution of shariah 
principles and increase shariah non-compliant risks, particularly when shariah compliance and 
controls functions are weak.  
In light of the shariah governance framework outlined in IFSB (2009), there are two 
channels through which shariah non-compliant income which is a proxy for shariah non-
compliant risk can be mitigated. The first channel directly involves of SC and the shariah 
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compliance function and the second relates to the indirect role of the BOD in carrying out the 
shariah audit role. Strengthening the shariah compliance function which includes shariah 
pronouncements by a SC and ensuring compliance with shariah pronouncements by an in-
house shariah compliance unit or department. The role of the shariah committee directly relates 
to the shariah compliance function whereby they advise and make recommendations to the 
BOD with regards to shariah matters. A stronger internal compliance environment is likely to 
reduce the shariah compliant risk ex-ante.  Thus, we might expect the shariah committee to 
have a direct relationship with shariah non-compliant risk due to the nature of their duties in 
the oversight of shariah compliance function through the in-house shariah compliance unit 
(IFSB, 2009). In jurisdictions that do not have any legal/regulatory requirements for shariah 
governance, Islamic banks institute SC to gain trust of their customers (Alkhamees 2012).  
 
While the shariah compliance unit works closely with the SC to ensure that the shariah 
pronouncements are implemented in the products and operations of the bank, the relationship 
between shariah audit unit and shariah committee is not well-defined. For example, whereas 
IFSB (2009) maintains that shariah audit unit should report to shariah committee, the regulatory 
guidelines on shariah governance issued by the central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) 
require shariah audit to report to Board Audit Committee (BNM 2010). The guidelines also 
assert that Board Audit Committee should determine the role of shariah audit upon consultation 
with the shariah committee and the shariah audit findings should be reported to both 
committees. Furthermore, all shariah non-compliant events should be reported to the board and 
BNM. Although there are no detailed regulatory guidelines on shariah governance in Indonesia 
with regards to auditing, the organizational structure of Bank Muamalat shows Shariah Audit 
function under Internal Audit Division (Bank Muamalat, 2016).  
The BOD’s role of mitigating SNCR works through the indirect link of shariah auditing. 
Since the high quality board of directors have more reputational capital, they are expected to 
be more concerned with reputational losses and maybe excessively involved in the banks’ 
operations including the assessment of shariah risk. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that 
an effective board demands an additional and extensive independent shariah audit from the 
shariah bodies including the shariah committee in order to certify their monitoring function as 
well as to protect the shariah law. Failure to constrain the shariah non-compliant risk may incur 
reputational damage, increase future legal risk exposures and disappoint the shareholders. As 
indicated, a large percentage of Islamic financial institutions’ investors and depositors are 
extremely concerned that their funds are utilized in a shariah-compliant manner (Chapra and 
Ahmed 2002). As the board of directors oversees the shariah non-compliance risk through 
shariah auditing function, we expect high-quality directors might demand more monitoring 
from the shariah committee including more shariah audit.  
The implication of an additional layer of shariah governance on the overall governance 
quality is complementary. Collectively, in order to mitigate non-compliance risk, the Islamic 
banks are expected to have an adequate system and control including good governance. Better 
corporate governance is expected to reduce the banks’ risk due to the anticipated involvement 
of the effective board of director and its subcommittees. The shariah committee is one of the 
main bodies in ensuring the overall bank’s operations are fully governed by shariah law which 
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is one of the objectives of Islamic banks. By presiding over the shariah compliance function 
and certifying the products as shariah compliant, the shariah committee provides credibility to 
the operations of Islamic banks for one of the key stakeholders, the depositors. However, given 
that the board of directors has a right to appoint and remove the shariah committee members, 
its role is equally crucial in promoting a higher degree of shariah compliance. In other words, 
the performance of shariah committee is founded in the practices and attitudes of the entire 
board of directors. Therefore, in this paper, while the demand for an effective shariah 
committee is recognised for the shariah compliance function, the monitoring and auditing roles 
of the board are argued to be the more important mechanisms to ensure that shariah law is 
implemented and protected. 
In terms of agency costs, the expenditures related to shariah governance systems would be 
related to monitoring costs and the losses of income from SNCR can be considered as a residual 
loss. The monitoring costs include expenditures incurred on staff in the shariah 
departments/units within the institution and additional costs of shariah committee. Shariah 
committee is an independent body with members paid fixed fees that are not contingent on the 
performance of banks they serve. With the rapid growth in Islamic finance globally, however, 
the number of shariah scholars who can have the appropriate knowledge on finance and satisfy 
the growing needs of the industry is limited. Given the scarcity, scholars with better reputation 
are sought after but they are expensive.3 Islamic financial institutions are willing to pay higher 
remuneration for well-known scholars as it improves recognition and credibility on the one 
hand and enhances the goodwill and brand image on the other hand (Rammal 2015). Even after 
incurring the monitoring costs, any remaining shariah non-compliant income would constitute 
‘residual loss’ since it cannot be distributed to shareholders (and depositors).4 
3.2. The effectiveness of the board and shariah committee 
Evidence suggests that several characteristics of the board of director and it sub-committees 
may influence their effectiveness in monitoring roles, including the size of the board/committee, 
the composition of independent directors, the frequency of meetings and compensation (John 
and Senbet, 1998; Canyon and He, 2011; Mayur and Saravanan, 2017; De Vita and Luo, 2018). 
Each of these characteristics is now reviewed.   
According to De Andres and Vallelado (2008), there is a trade-off between advantages and 
disadvantages in terms of human capital, monitoring, coordinating and control issues with 
regards to the size of the board. A larger board size or board subcommittee contribute more to 
human capital but is less effective due to the problems of coordination and process that, in turn, 
contribute to weak monitoring. Furthermore, evidence from prior studies has shown that 
smaller boards are more effective as directors can communicate better on themselves and they 
are easier to manage (Yermark, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998, Mollah and Zaman, 2015). These 
factors promote a more resourceful conversation. Based on these, we might expect that smaller 
                                                          
3 PWC (2009) reports that the number of reputable shariah scholars globally range between 20 to 30 and the best-
known scholars are compensated in millions of dollars per year.   
4 Jensen and Meckling (1976) define residual loss as the monetary value of reduction in welfare of the principal 
resulting from the divergence of agent’s decisions from that optimal ones that maximize the welfare of the former 
even after incurring monitoring and bonding costs.    
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boards and smaller shariah committee are more effective in constraining shariah non-compliant 
risk.  
Non-executive directors are associated with the responsibility of monitoring managers and 
thereby reducing agency costs that arise from the separation of ownership and control in day-
to-day company management (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Brennan and McDermott, 2004). Prior 
studies indicate that an independent board is an effective monitoring safeguard (Carcello et al., 
2002; Xie et al., 2003) and is more likely to be associated with lower firm risk (Chong et. al., 
2018; Mathew et al., 2018). Since the ultimate goal of Islamic banks is to adhere to shariah law, 
then the higher independence of non-executive directors on boards is expected to be more 
sensitive to the regulatory compliance, and act more conservatively toward the shariah 
committee in order to mitigate legal liability or reputational losses from bank default. As a 
result, we expect more independent non-executive on board reduced the shariah non-
compliance risk.  
 In board of directors’ studies, Conger et al. (1998) suggest that more frequent board 
meetings improve a board’s effectiveness as the meetings are a key dimension of board 
operations (Vafeas, 1999). Active boards that meet more frequently are more likely to perform 
their duties in accordance with shareholders’ interests (Vafeas, 1999) and to put more effort 
into monitoring the integrity of the management. In the audit committee literature, the firms 
with a higher number of audit committee meetings experience less financial restatement 
(Abbott et al., 2004) and are associated with lower incidences of earnings management (Xie et 
al., 2003). These studies suggest that the committees who meet regularly during the financial 
year are linked to effective monitoring. The more frequently they meet, the more efficiently 
they discharge their oversight responsibilities. Thus, we expect an inverse relationship between 
the meeting frequency of board and shariah committee with shariah non-compliant risk.  
Agency theory suggests that one way to monitor an agent’s behaviour is through their 
compensation contracts, enabling the interest between principal and agent to be perfectly 
aligned (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Consistent with the proposition of agency theory, the 
empirical evidence from archival studies suggests that executive/director compensations 
improve their monitoring ability and thus lead to an increase in firm performance (Mengistae 
and Xu, 2004; Chen et al., 2011; Newton, 2015). We argue that the board of director and shariah 
committee with a higher level of the compensation package is more efficient in constraining 
the shariah non-compliant risk.  For the latter, this is because higher compensation packages 
are associated with reputable board and shariah scholars who command more respect and can 
provide better oversight on the shariah compliance function.  
The shariah committee knowledge and experience are important elements in ensuring the 
effectiveness of their monitoring function. Borrowing from board and audit committee 
literature, directors that are financially literate can effectively assess the nature and the 
appropriateness of accounting choices, constrain the aggressiveness of accounting policies and 
provide incentives to avoid the risk of litigation (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005, DeFond et al. 
2005; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008). A shariah committee that is financially literate can 
address issues relating to financial statements and assess the shariah review and shariah audit 
works more efficiently. In addition, the appointment of shariah committee members with 
accounting and financial expertise improves the oversight function of the committees and thus 
provides a credible signal to the investors that the banks aspire to a higher quality of shariah 
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audit. We expect that shariah committee with accounting and financial expertise complements 
the knowledge of other shariah scholars in understanding of financial statements, which enables 
them to access the policies and issues related to financial reporting including risk assessment 
and management. 
In sum, based on the proposition of agency theory, concerning to monitoring roles and 
evidence from prior literature, we posit that a board of directors with a smaller size, more 
independent directors, more frequent meetings and higher compensation would be an effective 
board. Similarly, the shariah committee with a smaller size, equipped with accounting and 
financial expertise, more active and receiving higher compensation would be considered more 
effective. It is argued that the board of directors and shariah committee with these 
characteristics are more effective in constraining the shariah non-compliant risk in order to 
safeguard their reputation, to avoid legal exposure and to promote shareholders’ interests.   
 
4. Data, main variables and model specification 
 
The paper examines the role of corporate governance on shariah non-compliant risk in Islamic 
banks of Indonesia and Malaysia. Islamic banking in Indonesia started in 1992 with the 
establishment of Bank Muamalat Indonesia. The Islamic banking assets constitute 5.78% of 
the total banking assets with 13 Islamic banks and 21 commercial banks with Islamic business 
units operating among a total of 118 banks in 2017 in the country (IMF 2017 and OJK 2017). 
Islamic banking started in Malaysia with the enactment of Islamic Banking Law in 1983 and 
the establishment of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad in the same year. With a supportive legal 
and regulatory environment, Islamic banking sector has grown significantly in the country with 
16 Islamic banks compared to 27 conventional banks. With a share of 30% of the total banking 
assets in 2017, the Islamic banking sector has become systemically significant in the country 
(BNM 2018, IFSB 2017).  
 
Recognizing that most stakeholders deal with the Islamic banks for shariah compliant financial 
service, some countries have enacted laws and regulations that require having in place a 
credible shariah governance framework to protect their rights. Both Islamic Financial Services 
Act 2013 and the shariah governance guidelines of the central bank (Bank Negara Malaysia) 
in Malaysia cover details on shariah governance, compliance, and audit functions in Islamic 
banks.  Similarly, the Islamic Banking Act 2008 in Indonesia mandates Islamic financial 
institutions to have shariah committee to deal with shariah issues in banking operations. 
Though not providing details as in the case of Malaysia, the regulations outline the powers, 
scope and responsibilities of the shariah committee which include providing shariah opinions 
on the overall operations and monitoring compliance of bank operations with the rulings issued 
by national sharia council (Bank Indonesia 2004).  
 
4.1 Sample and data 
 
Our initial sample consists of 29 full-fledged Islamic banks in Malaysia and Indonesia with 
220 bank-year observations from the period 2007 to 2017. The sample of banks in the paper 
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includes all Islamic banks from both countries during the period of study. 5 We exclude 37 
observations because the data on shariah non-compliant income and corporate governance 
variables are unavailable. The final sample consists of 183 bank-year observations.  Table 1 
summarizes our sample selection process.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
All data is hand collected from the Islamic banks' annual reports with the exception of 
country-level data (i.e. GDP growth) collected from the World Bank database. The annual 
report is used because it is widely available and public information by virtue of the regulated 
disclosure rule under the regulatory bodies of Bank Negara Malaysia and Bank Indonesia. 
These annual reports are available and downloadable from the individual Islamic banks' 
websites.  
 
4.2 Measuring shariah non-compliance risk 
 
 Our proxy of shariah non-compliant risk is the shariah non-compliant income. We employ 
two alternative measures. The first measure is the natural log of shariah non-compliant income, 
assuming that a higher shariah non-compliant income indicates the higher shariah non-
compliance risk. The banks that reported zero shariah non-compliant income is set to one dollar 
to allow for log transmission. The second measure is a dummy variable. We set to 1 if the bank 
indicates positive shariah non-compliant income and set to 0 if bank report zero shariah non-
compliance income. We seek the likelihood of incidents of shariah non-compliance activities, 
assuming the positive shariah non-compliant income indicates the presence of shariah non-
compliant risk.6   
 
4.3 Measuring corporate governance 
 
We focus our analysis on the bank’s corporate board and shariah committee variables. For 
boards of directors, we select four essential features of boards’ governance, i.e. board size, 
composition of independent non-executive directors, meeting frequency and compensation. All 
characteristics were extensively studied the bank risk-taking literature (Vallascas et al., 2017; 
Berger et al., 2014). We define board size as the natural log of number of directors on the board. 
The board independence is measured by a percentage of independent directors to total board 
size7. The board of directors’ meetings is defined as the natural log of meeting frequency and 
                                                          
5 Only one bank in Malaysia (Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd.) and four banks in Indonesia (Bank BNI Syariah, Bank 
BRI Syariah, Bank Muamalat Indonesia and Bank Panin Dubai Syariah) are listed in the respective national stock 
markets.   
6 We have also consider the proxies of SNCI scaled by total asset, net income and total equity in our analysis, 
however all model indicate insignificant F-statistic. We expect the misspecification of the models are due to the 
insignificant amount of SNCI as compared to total assets, net income and total equity as well as the small sample 
size covered in our study. 
7 Indonesian banks operate with a two-tier board structure, thus board size is the total number of directors on board 
of commissioners and board of directors. While, board independence refers to the number of independent board 
of commissioners.  
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the board compensation is measured by the natural log of total compensation received by the 
directors. 
 For shariah committee, we focus on the size of the committee, number of committee 
members with accounting and financial expertise, number of meetings per annum and the 
compensation. The corporate governance literature suggests that these characteristics served 
important roles in measuring the effectiveness of board subcommittee (Brick and 
Chidambaran, 2010). We define the shariah committee’ size as the natural log of number of 
members sitting in shariah committee. The shariah committee’s financial expertise is measured 
by the number of members with accounting and financial qualification and experience, 
including all forms of formal education, professional qualification and work experience related 
to accounting and finance. The shariah committee meeting is measured by the natural log of 
meeting frequency. Lastly, we employ the natural log of total shariah committee’ 
compensations as a measurement of quality of members ability in monitoring the shariah non-
compliant risk.  
 
4.4 Model specification 
 
In order to examine the relationship between the boards of directors, shariah committee and 
the shariah non-compliant risk, the following models are employed: 
 
 SNCI = α0+β1BOD_size+ β2BOD_ind + + β3BOD_meeting + β4BOD_compensation 
+ β5SC_size + β6SC_act.expertise  + β7SC_meeting  + β8SC_compensation 
+ β9ASSET + β10AGE + β11GDPGR +  ε    
(1) 
 
 The dependent variable is shariah non-compliant income (SNCI) representing SNCR. As 
indicated, there are two measures of SNCI, namely SNCI_log, and SNCI_logit. The variables 
of interest include BOD_size, BOD_ind, BOD_meeting, BOD_compensation, SC_size, 
SC_act.expertise, SC_meeting, and SC_compensation.  
We control for the effects of other variables that have been found in prior literature to affect 
the bank’s risk (see Chen and Lin, 2016; Vallascas et al, 2017) – the natural log of total assets 
(ASSET), the natural log of bank age (AGE) and the country GDP growth (GDPGR). We argue 
that as bank size increases (ASSET), the banks’ business operations will be more complex and 
the banks may need to put more effort into dealing with shariah non-compliant risk. Thus, we 
expect these variables to be positively associated with shariah non-compliant income. As the 
age of the bank increases (AGE), they may gain more experiences in dealing with shariah risk, 
resulting in a lower shariah non-compliant risk. Thus, the present study predicts a negative 
relationship between the age of the bank and shariah non-compliant income. We also control 
for the economic performance of each country, with the country’s GDPGR serving as its proxy.  
 
5. Empirical findings 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
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 Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for shariah non-compliant income, hypothesis 
variables and related control variables containing minimum, lower quartile, mean, median, 
upper quartile, maximum and standard deviation. Panel A in Table 2 presents the hypothesis 
variables before the variables are transformed. The mean (median) of shariah non-compliant 
income (SNCI) for 183 bank-years is US$33,217 (US$4792). As a comparison to the economic 
magnitude of the amount of SNCI, we provide the mean (median) ratio of SNCI to total asset:  
0.00171(0.00036); SNCI to net income:  0.94958 (0.0311) and SNCI to equity: 0.01742 
(0.00329). Even though the amount of SNCI is relatively very small compared to the total assets, 
net income and equity of the sample, it may possibly effect the institutional reputation in the 
long run since the amount of SNCI indicates the incidence of shariah non-compliant risk. In the 
sample, there are 46 bank-year observations (i.e. 12 banks) report zero shariah non-compliant 
income, constituting 25.14% of the observations indicating zero shariah non-compliant 
activities/ transactions. With respect to the corporate governance variables, we find that the 
mean (median) of board size is   7.52 (7) and 65% of them are independent. As compared to 
Mak and Li (2001) who report the mean (median) for 147 Singapore Listed firms for the fiscal 
year 1995 as 8.04 (8), 57% of them are independent directors. This comparison implies that 
Islamic banks in Malaysia and Indonesia have higher representation of independent and non-
independent directors compared to the firms in Singapore 22 years ago. The mean (median) 
board of director’s meeting is 11.73 (11) times and the compensation is US$943,786 
(US$681,500) during a year. The mean size of the shariah committee is 3.78, which is relatively 
consistent with the figure reported in Mollah and Zaman (2015) who report the mean size of 
the shariah committee as 4.17. The mean (median) of shariah committee member with 
accounting and financial expertise is 1.04 (1). The average frequency of shariah committee 
meetings is 12.56 times a year and their yearly mean (median) compensation is US$72,628 
(US$55,563).   
 In Panel B in Table 2, we present the hypothesis variables and related control variables in 
the natural logarithm form and ratio. The mean (median) of these variables include: shariah 
non-compliant income at 7.03 (8.47); board size at 1.99 (1.95); board independence at 0.65 
(0.57), board meeting 2.35 (2.40), board compensation 13.46 (13.44), shariah committee size 
at 1.23 (1.10); shariah committee with accounting and financial expertise 0.24 (0), shariah 
committee meetings at 2.44 (2.49), shariah committee compensation at 10.85 (10.91); total 
assets at 21.22 (21.52) and the bank’s age at 2.00 (2.08). The means of GDP growth for 
Malaysia and Indonesia are 4.87% and 5.46%, respectively. However, the mean (median) GDP 
growth for both countries is 5.31% (5.29%) from the year 2007 to 2017.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
 Table 3 contains a correlation matrix of the variables used in the paper. In general, the 
overall correlation matrix shows that each of the variables is moderately inter-correlated with 
one and another except for variables SNCI_log and SNCI_logit with correlation coefficient of 
89%. However these correlation coefficients are not critical because these dependent variables 
are associated with different model specifications.  
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
5.2 Empirical results 
  
 In Table 4, we report our regression results of pooled OLS, GLS, and logistic regressions. 
The F statistics for all models are significant at p<0.001, suggesting that the models are 
statistically valid.  
 As expected the BOD_size is significant and positively associated with shariah non-
compliant risk, suggesting that banks with smaller board size experience lower shariah non-
compliant risk. There is a possibility that a smaller board contributes to effective 
communication and there is less likely of a communication breakdown. The effective 
communication of smaller boards is consistent with the previous studies by Yermark (1996) 
and Eisenberg et al. (1998). This finding suggests that when board members communicate 
effectively, they reduce the incidence of misunderstanding and consequent errors and that they 
are more sensitive to the shariah compliant issues.  
 The BOD_ind is significant and negatively related to shariah non-compliant risk. This 
finding is consistent with the proposition of agency theory that suggests the independence non-
executive director is an essential quality that contributes to a committee’s effective monitoring 
function (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The independent board is expected to provide unbiased 
assessment and judgement and to be able to monitor management effectively. This result 
suggests that the higher proportion of independence non-executive directors on boards motivate 
them to be more sensitive to the shariah regulatory compliance. They act more conservatively 
toward the shariah committee’s action and thus, reduced the shariah non-compliant risk. The 
likely cause for their action is to fulfil the fiduciary role of complying with shariah and mitigate 
the reputational risks that can arise from noncompliance.  
 We also document the inverse relationship between shariah committee with financial 
expertise and shariah non-compliant risk. The financial expertise assists the shariah committee 
to have access to resources that contribute to the superior ability to understand and interpret 
the business activities and risk assessment effectively. The finance and accounting knowledge 
and experience of shariah committee complement the shariah scholars understanding of 
financial statements and issues related to risk assessment and management. In other words, by 
having appropriate experience and knowledge in accounting and finance, is likely to improve 
shariah committee’ performance and judgement especially with regards to shariah compliant 
risk.  
 We find that the coefficient of SC_meeting is significant and negatively related to shariah 
non-compliant risk. This result suggests that a higher frequency of shariah committee meetings 
leads to lower shariah non-compliant risk.  This is consistent with the argument that when 
shariah committee meets more frequently, they reduce the likelihood of shariah non-compliant 
risk because regular meetings allow the shariah members to identify and resolve potential 
problems, particularly those that are related to the shariah compliant. This finding is consistent 
with the prior study that suggests board sub-committee who meet regularly during the financial 
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year are linked to effective monitoring (Abbot et al., 2004; Xie et al., 2003). The more 
frequently they meet, the more effective they discharge their oversight responsibilities. 
  The other corporate governance variables seem to provide inconsistent results or suggest 
insignificant relationships with shariah non-compliant risk across pooled OLS, GLS and 
logistic regressions. In particular, the SC_size is positive and significant with SCNR in most of 
the different estimators except in logistic regression. There is no evidence that board meeting, 
board compensation and shariah compensation are associated with shariah non-compliant risk. 
The results of all the control variables are insignificant except for AGE that suggests positive 
relationship with SNCR. As the age of the bank increases, they may gain more complex 
business models which overweight the collective knowledge that they have and thus increased 
the shariah risk non-compliant risk.   
  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
5.3. Additional analysis and robustness tests 
 
 We conduct several additional analysis and robustness tests as follows. First, we provide 
new definitions for board and shariah committee variables to see whether alternative definitions 
affect the main results. We define BOD_ned1 as the natural log of independent non-executive 
directors; the SC_act.expertise1 as dummy variable – coded 1 if at least one member of shariah 
committee equipped with accounting and financial expertise and 0 if otherwise; SC_meeting1 
as dummy variable – coded 1 if the percentage of shariah committee meeting during a year is 
more than sample median and 0 if otherwise;  SC_compensation1 as the ratio of shariah 
committee compensation to shariah committee size and SC_compensation2 as the ratio of 
shariah committee compensation to total asset. The results of GLS and logistic regressions as 
reported in Table 5 are qualitatively similar, suggesting the primary findings are robust to the 
alternative definitions of board and shariah committee variables.  
Second, we add more control variables (e.g. ROA, ROE and LEVERAGE) on the different 
models to test whether the inclusion of these variables would affect the primary results. None 
of these control variables is significant with shariah non-compliant risk. The main findings 
hold even with the inclusion of these additional control variables in Model 2 and Model 3 as 
reported in Table 5.   
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
 Third, we run the GLS and Logistic regressions on the two sub-samples –large and small 
banks as reported in Table 6. We split the sample into two subsets of data at the median of 
ASSET (a proxy for bank size) to observe if size effects exist. The banks that have ASSET above 
the median are identified as large banks and the banks that have ASSET below the median are 
identified as small banks. Most of the results are consistent with those obtained from the main 
analyses except for some of variables either significant under GLS or Logistic model in the 
large or small banks. For example, the BOD_size is insignificant under the logistic regression 
for small bank. However, in general the results are very similar in terms of the signs and 
significance to those reported in Table 4. The conclusions from the main findings are held.  
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[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
 Lastly, we run the two-stage least-square (2SLS) regression to address possible endogeneity 
issue. Prior literature suggests that most of the corporate governance variables are endogenous 
in nature because the firms choose their board or subcommittee members to suit their business 
operation and environment (Coles et al., 2008; Harris and Raviv, 2008). One of the possible 
sources of endogeneity that effect the relationship between corporate governance and bank 
risk-taking is reverse causality or simultaneity (Larcker and Richardson, 2004; Larcker and 
Rusticus, 2010). In this study, rather than the argument of effective board and shariah 
committee reduced the shariah non-compliant risk, the shariah non-compliant risk may also 
affect the effectiveness of board and shariah committee. For example, when the shariah non-
compliant risk is lower, there is possibility that the effectiveness level of board and shariah 
committee will be increased because they are less busy handling risk, and thus have more 
capacity to focus on strengthening their effectiveness. This reverse causality issue arises 
because corporate governance variables are dynamic (Wintoki et al., 2012; Cicero et al., 2013).  
 We perform Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests (Durbin 1954; Wu, 1973; Hausman, 1978) to 
all our corporate governance variables individually in order to investigate the presence of 
endogeneity in our study. Table 7 presents the results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. The 
results suggest that all the variables (BOD_size; BOD_meeting, BOD_compensation, SC_size, 
SC_act.expertise, SC_meeting and SC_compensation) are insignificant except for BOD_ned 
that confirmed the presence of endogeneity. To address this concern, we run instrumental 
variables (IV) with 2SLS regression consistent with the prior literature (e.g. Larcker and 
Rusticus, 2010; Katmon and Farooque, 2017). We employed a two-year lagged value of board 
of director independent, BOD_nedt-2, as an instrumental variable consistent to Sila et al. (2015). 
This BOD_nedt-2 lagged variable is valid to be instrumental variable under the assumption that 
independent directors may take at least a year to be changed and the board members must be 
in their roles for some time to have an impact on the shariah non-compliant risk. The BOD_nedt-
2 has fulfilled the following conditions: (i) outside the regression model, (ii) uncorrelated with 
regression errors and (3) strongly correlated with endogenous variables.8 To ensure the IVs are 
valid, we estimated the reduced form equations on the first stage of 2SLS regression and 
examined the significance level of the endogenous variables (Adkins and Hill, 2007: 249-250). 
We also check the strength of our IV using the F-statistics for the first-stage 2SLS regression 
following Staiger and Stock (1997). Our F-statistics in the first stage is 62.86, which is higher 
than 10 (cut-off point). Therefore, we conclude that our IV is valid and reliable to be 
instrumented in our 2SLS regression. The results of first-stage and second stage of 2SLS 
                                                          
8 We have also consider other IV for BOD_ned, i.e portfolio rank, BOD_quartile rank – the rank value is based on the 
quartile that fall into four equal-size of portfolio (i.e. categories 1-4, based on the lowest to the highest value. 
Similar to BOD_nedt-2, we estimated the reduced form equations on the first stage of 2SLS regression and 
examined the significance level of the BOD_ned. The IV meets the suggested criterions. The results for 2SLS 
regression is relatively similar as reported in the main findings. 
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regression are presented in Table 8. The results of 2SLS regressions are relatively consistent 
with the main findings reported in Table 4. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This study represents one of the first attempts to study the relationships between corporate 
governance and shariah non-compliant risk. Although the corporate governance literature is 
quite developed, no prior study examines the link between corporate governance mechanism 
and shariah non-compliant risk which is unique for Islamic banks. Also, to the extent that the 
finance literature has examined corporate governance mechanisms at the board level, this study 
extends the literature by including the shariah committee characteristics (size, financial 
expertise, meeting frequency and compensation). We perform our investigation on Islamic 
banks from Malaysia and Indonesia over the period 2007 to 2017. 
The empirical results indicate that the banks with a smaller board and a higher proportion 
of independent board are likely to have lower shariah non-compliance risk. The results also 
indicate that the financial expertise and higher frequency of shariah committee meetings reduce 
the shariah non-compliant risk. Collectively, our analysis shows that banks with strong 
corporate governance environments reduce shariah non-compliant risk. These results are robust 
to various model specifications and tests.  
Being the first paper to explore shariah non-compliance risk in Islamic banks, the findings 
should be of potential interest to different stakeholders such as policy makers, professionals, 
the boards of directors and academics, especially on issues relating to corporate governance 
practice and shariah non-compliant risk. They may use the findings as guidance to see how the 
characteristics of the board and shariah committee may influence bank risk-taking as well as 
in planning strategies to mitigate future losses with regards to shariah non-compliant risk and 
can potentially enhance reputational risk.  There is a need to carry out further research to extend 
our study and explore more on the roles that shariah bodies play in governance and other 
effective characteristics of board and shariah committees.   
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